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Economics and Mathematical Theory of Games
Ajda Fošner
The theory of games is a branch of applied mathematics that is used
in economics, management, and other social sciences. Moreover, it is
used also in military science, political science, international relations,
computer science, evolutionary biology, and ecology. It is a field of
mathematics in which games are studied. The aim of this article is to
present matrix games and the game theory. After the introduction, we
will explain the methodology and give some examples. We will show
applications of the game theory in economics. We will discuss about
advantages and potential disadvantages that may occur in the described
techniques. At the end, we will represent the results of our research and
its interpretation.
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Introduction
We all know a lot of diﬀerent games that are played for relaxation or a fi-
nancial gain. There are also a lot of people (young and old) that are play-
ing games every day. Some of these games (roulette, for example) involve
no skills and are purely games of chance. We will not be interested in this
kind of games. However, on the other side there are games (chess, for
example) that are entirely games of skills. Moreover, there are also games
(football, for example) that involve both, chance and strategy. Finally,
there are so called games of strategy and conflict. They involve choices of
alternative strategies, conflicting interests of the players, and payoﬀ to
the players. Playing the stock market, developing real estate, conducting
a business against competitors – these are examples of such games. Ac-
tually, these and other similar activities would not ordinarily be thought
of as games but they are games in the sense that we have just described.
The game theory started to develop in 1944 with the book Theory of
Games and Economics Behavior, written by John von Neumann and Os-
car Morgenstern. This book was a major step in the use of mathematical
analyses to solve some problems in the modern society. In 1970s the the-
ory of games was applied to biology. Nowadays, the game theory is an
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table 1 Price decision
C2: raise C2: no change C2: lower
C1: raise 0 –10 –50
C1: no change 3 0 –10
C1: lower 50 3 0
important tool in many fields. Until now, eight game theorists have won
theNobelMemorial Prize in Economics Science. Let us alsomention that
John Maynard Smith was awarded the Crafoord Prize for applications of
the game theory to biology.
Usually we speak of a game as a process of interaction that involves
individuals (two or more). Game is a subject of some fixed rules and
has a specified collection of payoﬀs according to every possible outcome.
As we already mentioned, there are games that are played for relaxation.
On the other hand, there are games that are studied by the scientists.
These gamesmay be far from amusing, as it is illustrated by the following
examples.
The first example is actually an example of a game, which we can be
found in economics.
example 1
Suppose that a specific product is manufactured only by two companies,
the company C1 and the company C2. Of course, they are in competi-
tion for the entire market. We also know that the first company C1 is the
larger company and it has a larger share of the market. Every January
both companies have to decide whether to raise, lower, or not change the
price for the product. In table 1, the gains and losses (in millions of eu-
ros) for the first company corresponding to the various possible pairs of
decisions are represented.
The natural question here is: What decision should the first company
make according to the table 1? This is the point, where we can use the
theory of games and mathematical analyses to solve the problem.
The next example is so called battle of the sexes.
example 2
Mary and George decided to go out on a date this evening. Of course,
they have to decide where to meet and what to do together. They have
two possibilities: they can meet in the center of the city and go to the
cinema, or they can go dancing to the nearby dancing club. Mary likes
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table 2 Battle of the sexes
G: dancing G: cinema
M: dancing M: 3
G: 2
M: 1
G: 1
M: cinema M: 0
G: 0
M: 2
G: 3
M
G
G
3,2
1,1
0,0
2,3
D
C
D
C
D
C
figure 1 Battle of the sexes
to dance and she would prefer to go to the dancing club. On the other
hand, George would like to go to the cinema. In any case, they both prefer
doing something together than canceling the date.
The payoﬀs of this game are represented in table 2. The numbers quan-
tify the utilities obtained by Mary and George for each combination (the
first number is for Mary and the second one for George). We can present
the outcomes of the battle of the sexes also with a graph (figure 1).
Here, each vertex represents a point of choice for a player (M – Mary,
G – George). The lines out of the vertex show a possible action for that
player (D – dancing, C – cinema). The payoﬀs are specified at the end of
the graph (Vega-Redondo 2003).
More examples can be found in (Mizrahi and Sullivan 1993), (Khoury
and Parsons 1981), and (Brown and Brown 1977).
Methodology and Examples
Themathematical theory of games deals with the situations in which two
ormore persons with conflict interests are involved. The outcome of such
games depends on some chance, but primarily on skills and intelligence
of the participants. In some certain areas of economics, politics, military
science, and operations research there are many conflicting situations to
which the theory of games can be applied.
In this section, we shall discuss only about two-person games (primar-
ily zero-sum two person games) because of the diﬃculties that arise in
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the mathematical theory of n-person games.We will also assume that the
players play as well as it is possible.
First, we will introduce the matrix game played by two players. Let G
be am×nmatrix of some real numbers (here are no restrictions: numbers
can be positive, negative, or even zero). This matrix is also called the
payoﬀ matrix of a given matrix game which is played by two persons.
One of the players is the row player R and the other player is the column
player C.
G =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
g11 g12 · · · g1n
g21 g22 · · · g2n
g31 g32 · · · g3n
...
...
. . .
...
gm1 gm2 · · · gmn
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (1)
Let us point out that the entries gij of a matrix G represent the payoﬀ
from C to R: numbers gij are ‘wins’ for a row player and ‘looses’ for a
column player. Here, of course, a negative win is a loss and a zero win is
a draw.
How do we play this game? The row player R chooses a row (the nat-
ural number between 1 and m) and the column player C chooses the
column (the natural number between 1 and n) of a given matrix G. Then
they simultaneously tell their choices. Of course, before that the players
must not disclose their choices to each other. The most common way to
play this game is that both, the row player and the column player, write
their choices secretly on a slip of paper and then they simultaneously
expose the written number.
Now, suppose that R chooses row i (i ≤ i ≤ m) and Cchooses column
j (1 ≤ j ≤ n). Then the number gij in the matrix G is the chosen number.
If gij > o, then C pays R exactly gij eur. On the contrary, if gij < O, then
R pays C the amount of −gij eur. In the case of gij = 0 no payments are
made.
Let us show one simple example of a matrix game.
example 3
G =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−1 10
1 5
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ . (2)
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Suppose that the abovematrix represents the payoﬀmatrix of a matrix
game. If we look at the numbers in the given matrix, then we see that the
row player can win 10 eur by choosing the first row (this is the best
outcome for him). On the other hand, the column player will probably
not choose the second column since in that case he will definitely lose at
least 5 eur. However, if he chooses the first column, he can lose just 1
eur or even win 1 eur. Thus, if C is intelligent, he will choose the first
column. And if the row player concludes this assumption, he will decide
to play the second row and win 1 eur.
Therefore, the result that we conclude is: the row player will play the
second row and the column player will choose the first column. There-
fore, R will win 1 eur and C will lose 1 eur.
From the matrix G, we can easily see that the row player will always
win if he chooses the second row. On the other hand, he can lose, if he
tries with the first row. Hence, the row player can guarantee that he will
always win at least 1 eur by choosing the second row and the column
player can guarantee by playing the first column that he will get no more
than that.
We can say that there is a sort of equilibrium in this game and the value
1 eur represents and illustrates the so called rationality assumption. We
assume that we should choose our strategy in such a way that the worst
thing that could happen to us is as good as possible. Therefore, in this
kind of games the rational assumption is that we expect to win only what
we can guarantee for ourselves.
strategies in matrix games
If the row player of a matrix game G chooses row i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the
worst thing that can happen is that he would win (or lose, if the entry is
negative) the least entry in the chosen row. Thus, he would choose the
row whose least entry is as big as possible. In other words, he would play
any row whose least entry has the value
max1≤i≤m(min1≤j≤n gij). (3)
This is called the maximin strategy.
Similarly, if the column player of a matrix game G chooses row j, 1 ≤
j ≤ n, the worst thing that can happen is that he loses the largest entry
in the chosen column. Therefore, if the column player tries to make his
outcome as good as possible, he will choose the column whose largest
entry is as small as possible. That entry has the value
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table 3 Maximin strategy and minimax strategy
Row minima
0 3 1 4 0
3 –2 4 –1 –2
3 –3 2 –2 –3
Column maxima 3 3 4 4
min1≤j≤n(max1≤i≤m gij). (4)
This is the minimax strategy.
In the Example 3, the maximum of the row minima is 1 and also the
minimum of the column maxima is 1. This value is in the second row
and first column (g21 = 1). Thus, maximin strategy for the row player is
to play the second row and the minimax strategy for the column player
is to play the first column.
In the above example, the maximin value is equal to the minimax
value. The following example of a matrix game will show that this is not
always true.
example 4
Let us consider a matrix game with the payoﬀ matrix.
G =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 3 1 4
3 −2 4 −1
3 −3 2 −2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (5)
Table 3 will help us to calculate maximin and minimax values.
Now we can easily calculate that the maximin value is equal to 0 and
the minimax value is 3. Therefore, the maximin strategy for the row
player is to play the first row and the minimax strategy for the column
player is to play the first or the second column. This means that the col-
umn player has two possibilities: he can choose either column 1 or col-
umn 2. Nevertheless, the most important here is that the maximin value
is not equal to the minimax value.
If the row player plays the first row, he will not do worse than gain
nothing. On the other hand, if the column player plays either the first or
the second column, he will not do worse than lose 3 eur. This means
that if the row player chooses the first row and the column player plays
the first column, then both players gain nothing. On the other hand,
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if the row player chooses the first row and the column player plays the
second column, then the row player win 3 eur.
Let us also mention that one of the players has to do better than lose
on any given play. This points out that the maximin andminimax strate-
gies are generally too cautious. Moreover, this game is unstable. In other
words, if one of the players insists on always playing a particular strategy,
then the other player can take the advantage of this fact. For example,
if the row player decides to play the first row all the time, then (after a
few plays) the column player will always choose the first column. Thus,
both players will gain nothing. However, if the player R notices that C
is always playing the first column, then the row player will switch to the
second row. Thus, R will win 3 eur. Nevertheless, after a few plays C will
switch to column 2 and start taking 2 eur from the row player. Further-
more, when the row player notices that Calways plays column 2, he will
start to choose row 1. Therefore, we are back at the beginning. This shows
that no one strategy is good for either player if this game is played many
times.
In the last few decades, a lot of mathematicians have been studied ma-
trix games and the game theory. They have done a tremendous work at
this field. Let us just mention the recent result of Akain, Gaubert, and
Guterman (2011). They showed that several decision problems originat-
ing from max-plus or tropical convexity are equivalent to mean payoﬀ
(zero-sum, two players) game problems.
The following problems are basic in max-plus or tropical algebra. The
problems are taken from Akain, Gaubert, and Guterman (2011). See also
Akain, Gaubert, and Guterman (2010).
problem 1
Given m × n matrices A = (Aij) and B = (Bij) with entries in R ∪ {−∞},
does there exist a vector x ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})n non-identically −∞ such that
the inequality Ax ≤ Bx holds in the tropical sense, i. e.,
max1≤j≤n(Aij + xj) ≤ max1≤j≤n(Bij + xj) (6)
for every i ∪ {1, 2, . . . ,m}?
problem 2
Given m × n matrices A = (Aij) and B = (Bij) with entries in R ∪ {−∞},
and two vectors c, d of dimension n with entries in R∪ {−∞}, does there
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exist a vector x ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})n such that the inequality Ax + c ≤ Bx + d
holds in the tropical sense, i. e.,
max(max1≤j≤n(Aij + xj), ci) ≤ max(max1≤j≤n(Bij + xj), di) (7)
for every i ∪ {1, 2, . . . ,m}?
problem 3
Given m ≥ n and an m × n matrix A = (Aij) with entries in R ∪ {−∞},
are the columns of A tropically linearly dependent? For example, can we
find scalars x1, x2, . . . , xn ∈ R ∪ {−∞}, not all equal to −∞, such that the
equation Ax = 0 holds in the tropical sense, meaning that for every value
of i ∪ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, when evaluating the expression
max1≤j≤n(Aij + xj) (8)
the maximum is attained by at least two values of j?
Akain, Gaubert, and (Guterman 2011) proved that the first problem is
equivalent to the existence of a winning initial state for a mean payoﬀ
game problem. The second problem can be transformed in linear time
to the problem of knowing whether a prescribed initial state of a mean
payoﬀ game is winning, and vice versa. Moreover, the third problem can
be transformed in quadratic time to the problem of the existence of a
winning initial state in a mean payoﬀ game.
Using the Game Theory in Economics
As we already mentioned, economics is one of the major fields where the
game theory is used. Bargaining, fair division, social network formation,
and voting systems auctions are just some of the economics phenom-
ena, which are analyzed with the use of a game theory. Note also that
the payoﬀ of the game represents the utility of individual players and in
modeling situations this is money. In other words, money corresponds
to the individual’s utility. However, here we have to be careful because
this assumption can be faulty (Vega-Redondo 2003).
Scientists usually focus in their research on the sets of strategies, which
are known as equilibrium in games. Themost famous is theNash equilib-
rium. A set of strategies is the Nash equilibrium if no player can do better
by unilaterally changing his strategy. In other words, the Nash equilib-
rium is a concept of a game in which each player is assumed to know
the strategies of the other players and no player has anything to gain by
changing only his own strategy unilaterally. For example, David and John
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are in the Nash equilibrium if David is making the best decision taking
into account John’s decision and John is making the best decision taking
into account David’s decision. Let us point out that this does not nec-
essary mean the best payoﬀ for David and John. Usually players might
improve their payoﬀ, if they choose another strategy.
When analyzing some specific game, scientists usually start by present-
ing a game. This game is an abstraction of an economic situation. Then
some solution concepts are chosen. At the end, the researchers illustrate
which strategy sets are the equilibrium of the appropriate type. Here we
can use either a descriptive analyses or a prescriptive, normative analy-
ses. Some researchers believe that by finding the equilibrium of a studied
game they can predict how actually human population will behave when
they are in the situations analogous to the game. This is a descriptive way
of analyses. Nevertheless, in normative analyses scientists see a game the-
ory as a suggestion for how people ought to behave in a specific situation
and not as a predictive tool for the behavior of human beings.
In the following, we will present a fundamental problem in the game
theory, the so called prisoner’s dilemma, which demonstrates why two
people might not cooperate even if it is in both their best interests to do
so.
In the prisoner’s dilemma, two players can choose either cooperative
or defective move. If both players cooperate then they both gain, but if
one of the players defects, then he will gain more and the other, who
cooperates, will gain less. And finally, if both players defect, both gain
little.
Example 5
A classical example of the prisoner’s dilemma is presented as follows: Two
criminals (say,P1 and P2) are arrested under the suspicion that they have
committed a crime. However, the police do not have enough proofs to
convict the suspects. Thus, the police separate both prisoners and visit
each of them to oﬀer the same deal: the one who oﬀers evidence against
the other one will be freed.
If both prisoners remain silent, then both are sentenced to only four
months in jail. In fact, they are cooperating against the police and they
both gain. However, if one of them betrays the other one and the other
remains silent, the betrayer goes free (he gains more) and the other one
will be punished with six-year sentence. If both prisoners betray, both
will be punished (two years in jail), but less than if one of them refused
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table 4 The prisoner’s dilemma
P1: silent P2: betrays
P1: silent P1: 4 months
P2: 4 months
P1: 6 years
P2: goes free
P1: betrays P1: goes free
P2: 6 years
P1: 2 years
P2: 2 years
table 5 An example of the prisoner’s dilemma
B: cooperates B: defects
A: cooperates A: 5 points
B: 5 points
A: –10 points
B: 10 points
A: defects A: 10 points
B: –10 points
A: 0 points
B: 0 points
to talk. The dilemma resides in the fact that each prisoner has a choice
between only two options, but cannot make a good decision without
knowing what the other one will do (table 4).
Therefore, the question is: how should the prisoners act?
In the next example, we will present the prisoner’s dilemma between
two players which can be applied to everyday life.
example 6
In many situations the kind of distribution of losses and gains, that we
have described in the above example, seems natural. For simplicity, we
might consider the prisoner’s dilemma as follows: if both players defect,
then they both get 0 points. If only one defects, he will get 10 points and
the cooperator 10 points. Finally, if both players cooperate, then each
of them gets 5 points. Of course, there would always be a temptation to
defect, since the gain for mutual cooperation is only 5 points and the gain
for one-sided defection is 10 points (table 5).
The problem in the prisoner’s dilemma is that if both players were
purely rational, they would never cooperate, since the rational decision
means that you make the decision, which is best for you whatever the
other actor chooses. Hence, if both decision makers are rational, both
will decide to defect and none of them will gain anything. However,
if both would cooperate, both would gain. This paradox is formulated
more explicitly through so-called principle of suboptimization: optimiz-
ing the outcome for a subsystem will in general not optimize the out-
come for the system as a whole (the whole is more than the sum of its
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table 6 The prisoner’s dilemma in the advertising
F2: advertising F2: no advertising
F1: advertising F1: loses
F2: loses
F1: benefits greatly
F2: loses much
F1: no advertising F1: loses much
F2: benefits greatly
F1: benefits
F2: benefits
parts). We will continue with the example of the prisoner’s dilemma in
the advertising.
example 7
At the beginning, let us mention that the advertising is sometimes called
a real life example of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Suppose that two competitive firms in Slovenia (we will denote them
by F1 and F2) have to decide how much money they will spend on the
advertising. The profit derived from the advertising for the firm F1 is,
of course, partially determined by the advertising made by the firm F2.
Similarly, the eﬀectiveness of the firm F2’s advertising depends on the ad-
vertising conducted by the firm F1. If both, the firm F1 and the firm F2,
choose to advertise receipts remain constant and the expenses increase
due to the cost of the advertising. Both firms would benefit if they both
decide not to advertise. However, if one of the firms chooses not to ad-
vertise, the others could benefit greatly by the advertising (table 6). More
about the prisoner’s dilemma you can read in Heylighen (1992; 1995).
Conclusion
The game theory is a branch of mathematics that deals with the analyses
of situations involving parties with conflicting interests. When dealing
with simple games we can represent a complete mathematical solution.
On the other hand, we can find principles of the game theory also in
complicated games such as chess, cards, and checkers, as well as in real-
world problems (in economics, property division, politics, and warfare).
The theory of games is actually the theory of social situations. Namely,
most researchers in the game theory focus on how groups of people in-
teract: how intelligent individuals interact with one another in a specific
situation to achieve their own goals.
In the classical game theory, players move, bet, or strategize simulta-
neously. In this branch of the game theory both hidden information and
chance elements are frequent features.
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The theory of games is one of the tools that have been used to study
a wide variety of not just human but also animal behavior. It was first
developed in economics to explore and understand the behavior of mar-
kets, firms, consumers and other economic behaviors. Nowadays the
game theory has been applied to political, psychological, and sociological
behaviors as well.
As we have already mentioned, the game theory is also used in the
study of animal behavior. Note that even Charles Darwin made a few
informal game theoretic statements. Later, the development of the game
theory in economics was applied to biology.
Furthermore, the game theory has also been used to develop theories
of ethical or normative behavior. In schools, the game theory helps to
understand good and proper behavior.
Let us also mention that applications of the theory of games have not
been so far reaching as was hoped. Actually considerable diﬃculties arise
in the mathematical theory of n-person games for n > 2.
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